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“ODIOUS DEBTS” VS. DEBT TRAP:  
A REALISTIC HELP? 
Christoph G. Paulus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
t seems there are not too many lawyers who have an understanding 
of or about the technical meaning of “odious debts.” Nevertheless, 
this highly dubious doctrine—if it is one, but for reasons of simplifica-
tion it will be called a doctrine in what follows—has the potential of al-
most explosive power for many lender states in this world. Just a glance 
at the internet under this catchword makes clear where this power comes 
from. Literally dozens of NGOs claim that states like Iraq are debt-free—
not because the lender states should display grace after liberation from 
Saddam Hussein, but because of legal consequence! “Odious debts” are 
understood as a legal institution which, by force of law, make certain 
debts automatically null and void.1 
The doctrine of “odious debts” dates back little more than one hundred 
years. Because it has been topical only sporadically over this period, it is 
unclear whether or not it already has the precision or “marginal sharp-
ness” that would be necessary if it were to be used as a legal instrument. 
This uncertainty, in turn, makes the term “odious debts” appear very ver-
satile in the ways it can be used and instrumentalised. In particular, the 
value statement already inherent in the terminology tends to mislead one 
into exploiting this doctrine to attempt to render morally repugnant facts 
legally null and void. In view of these facts, it is the (thankless) task of 
the legal scholar to call for an exercise of caution in drawing conclusions 
of this sort (however understandable they may be in human terms), and 
to point out the distinction between law and morality,2 which is a hard-
                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, L.L.M. Consultant to the IMF. 
Member of the International Insolvency Institute, the American College of Bankruptcy 
and the International Association of Procedural Law. Dean of International Affairs. Di-
rector of the German-American Lawyers’ Association, Berlin. A similar version of this 
paper appears as Do “Odious Debts” Free Over-indebted States from the Debt Trap?, 10 
UNIFORM L. REV. 469 (2005). 
 1.  Thus, debt forgiveness is seen as an improper act of voluntary grace. If there is 
instead a legal automatism, there is no room for grace and reciprocal gratitude. For the 
“traditional” treatment of state debts and the possibility of their restructuring, see, for 
example, FABIO MARCELLI, IL DEBITO ESTERO DEI PAESI IN VIA DI SVILUPPO NEL DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE (2004); see also AUGUST REINISCH & GERHARD HAFNER, STAAT-
ENSUKZESSION UND SCHULDENÜBERNAHME BEIM “ZERFALL” DER SOWJETUNION (1995). 
 2. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRÜNDE DER RECHTSLEHRE § E, 
at 47 (William Hastie trans., A.M. Kelley 1974) (1887). 
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won victory in legal history and which requires recognition by the legal 
community. 
This exhortation naturally does not negate the option of developing le-
gally practicable contours with the help of which certain debts can be 
termed “odious” and can accordingly be dealt with on a legal level. It is 
only an attempt to clarify the fact that moral indignation, however justi-
fied, cannot automatically produce the desired legal consequences by 
using a purportedly legal concept. For this, the term must be defined 
more precisely in legal terms. This paper will look at the extent to which 
this appears feasible at the present time. 
II. HISTORY OF THE “ODIOUS DEBTS” CONCEPT 
The phenomenon of efforts being made to seek a way of ending debt 
repayment at the state level looks back on a long history.3 The first re-
corded use of the concept of “odious debt” in this respect dates back to 
1898 where it was cited by the United States of America.4 In the wake of 
the Spanish-American War, from which the United States emerged victo-
rious, “odious debt” was taken as a justification for not repaying Cuba’s 
debts to Spain, which the United States, as the de facto ruling power over 
Cuba, should normally have honoured.5 The United States claimed that 
these debts were “odious” because the money lent to Cuba by Spain, 
which then had to be repaid, would have served to consolidate and per-
petuate the oppression of the Cuban people.6 
The term resurfaced about a quarter century later in Costa Rica, trig-
gered by an act of Parliament and the subsequent arbitration proceed-
ings.7 In 1919, Costa Rica managed to end the dictatorship of Frederico 
Tinoco and passed a law (the Law of Nullities) repudiating the debts 
granted by the Royal Bank of Canada to the dictator in the name of Costa 
                                                                                             
 3. See, e.g., MAX HUBER, DIE STAATENSUCCESSION 84 (1898); M.H. Hoeflich, 
Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the International Law of Public 
Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 39 (1982). For other 
precedents (although not expressly based on the principle of odious debts) see Theo 
Kneifel, Kirchliche Arbeitsstelle Südliches Afrika (KASA), “Odious Debts”—Ein Son-
derfall von Illegitimen Schulden am Beispeil der Apartheidschulden Südafrikas (Feb. 
2002), www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/odiousdebts_KASA.pdf; Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano, Odious Debts und das Weltrecht, 36 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 223 (2003), 
available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/Fischer-Lescano.pdf. 
 4. Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 53–54. 
 5. See generally Sovereignty: Its Acquisition and Loss, The Cuban Debt, 1 MOORE 
DIGEST § 97, at 351–85 (summarizing the peace negotiations between the United States 
and Spain); ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 329 (1931). 
 6. MOORE, supra note 5, at 367. 
 7. Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 375 (1923). 
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Rica, on the ground that they were “odious.”8 The subsequent arbitration 
proceedings ended in 1923 when the arbitrator, Chief Justice Taft of the 
United States Supreme Court, upheld the right of Costa Rica to act in this 
way.9 
A few years later, the legal scholar Alexander Nahum Sack produced 
an in-depth study in which he examined attempts to define the doctrine 
of “odious debts” precisely in legal terms, such that it could be opera-
tionalised.10 According to Sack, a successor state is only bound to repay 
the debts of its predecessor if the funds thus obtained were used to meet 
the needs of the state and were obtained in the best interests of the state.11 
If, however, (1) the funds were not used to meet the needs of the state 
and were not obtained in the best interests of the state, and (2) the credi-
tors were aware of this fact, then the granting of the loan represents a 
hostile act against the people of the debtor state, which renders the debt 
“odious” and thus invalid.12 
Sack is often held to be the academic who has dealt most in-depth with 
the issue of what happens to national debts after a regime change.13 He is 
still in some respects considered the “crowned prince” of advocates of 
this legal principle. Recently, however, his proposal has been taken one 
step further in a Canadian study.14 The authors of the Canadian study 
propose that the “odiousness” of a national debt should be determined 
not only on the basis of the two criteria advanced by Sack (i.e., use of the 
funds to the benefit of and in the best interests of the state, and the 
knowledge on the part of the lender that this is not the case).15 They ar-
gue that a third, objective criterion should be added—that the debts must 
have been taken out with the consent of the population.16 
In the early 1980’s, the International Law Commission had already 
tried to find a definition in the context of developing the Vienna Conven-
                                                                                             
 8. Id. at 376. 
 9. Id. at 399. 
 10. See generally ALEXANDER NAHUM SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES 
ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÉRES: TRAITÉ 
JURIDIQUE ET FINANCIER (1927) [hereinafter SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS]; 
ALEXANDER NAHUM SACK, LA SUCCESSION AUX DETTES PUBLIQUES D’ÉTAT 70 (1929). 
 11. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 157. 
 12. Id. 
 13. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 5, at 16. 
 14. Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doc-
trine (Mar. 11, 2003) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.odiousdebts. 
org/odiousdebts/publications/Advancing_the_Odious_Debt_Doctrine.pdf. 
 15. Id. at 42. 
 16. Id. 
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tion on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts from April 4, 1983.17 The proposal was as follows: 
Article C. Definition of odious debts 
For the purposes of the present articles, “odious debts” means:  
(a) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to  
attaining objectives contrary to the major interests of the successor  
State or of the transferred territory;  
(b) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with an aim and for a  
purpose not in conformity with international law and, in particular, the  
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United  
Nations.18 
However, not only was this article not inserted into the Convention, the 
Convention itself has not yet come into force at all.19 
To conclude this brief historical outline, it can be said that these lines 
of thought and argumentation leave too great a vacuum in theory and in 
practice for us to accept the principle of “odious debts” as a legal institu-
tion recognised under customary law.20 For this to happen, the principle 
would have to have been applied over a longer period and would have to 
be recognised as a legal obligation.21 
III. PURPOSE OF “ODIOUS DEBTS” 
Before we go on to look at the question of whether and how the doc-
trine of “odious debts” can or could be used legally in the future, at least 
in the proposed manner, it would be helpful to clarify the purpose of this 
new legal principle. 
A. The Original Purpose 
The two historical examples given above in Part II were retrospective. 
Therefore, the outcome could not have been foreseen by the two parties 
to the loan agreement when the loan was originally granted. Thus, (from 
                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 33. 
 18. Documents of the Thirty-Third Session, [1981] II Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 79, U.N. 
DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (82.V.4). 
 19. See KNUT IPSEN, VÖLKERRECHT, in JURISTISCHE KURZ-LEHRBÜCHER NO. 5, at 347 
(2004). 
 20. See also Fischer-Lescano supra note 3. On customary law from the stance of in-
ternational law as a whole, see CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENSURING 
THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND IN THE EVE OF A NEW CENTURY, in ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1999 NO. 281, at 324 (2001). 
 21. See IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN & TORTSTEN STEIN, VÖLKERRECHT § 28 para. 
467, at 99 (10th ed. 2000). 
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a European legal stance) an essential prerequisite of law is not met—the 
tenet that the law should act as an instrument to steer the behaviour of 
actors.22 
It is true that this deficiency alone is not enough to call into question 
the legal validity of the measures, particularly for customary law. Thus, a 
generally accepted source of law is characterised precisely by the fact 
that somewhere, at some point in time, a new legal understanding 
emerges which, in the course of time, becomes so convincing that it 
eventually becomes an integral part of the general notion of justice.23 We 
have not yet reached this point with respect to the doctrine of “odious 
debts.” Even if one hundred percent agreement is not needed to achieve 
this level of acceptance, neither is it enough for a few small groups to be 
convinced of the legal validity of a concept for it to become accepted as 
customary law. 
B. Today’s Purpose 
The direct purpose of the doctrine of “odious debts,” as laid out in the 
terms of reference for this study, is to create the sort of impact which 
would steer the behaviour of relevant actors. Like a signal, it should re-
mind the parties involved in future loan agreements to respect the limits 
of private autonomy (Privatautonomie) set by the new legal principle. 
This doctrine would thus take its place among a number of existing le-
gal regulations—in particular those under private and constitutional 
law—which act as protective mechanisms against any overly-hasty and 
thus irresponsible commitment on the part of a state.24 Usually, both con-
stitutional and civil law clearly state what formalities a country must 
comply with before entering into a commitment of this sort. If these for-
malities are ignored, which according to reports appears to be the case 
more often than not, the commitments regularly have no legally binding 
impact, even under private law.25 A doctrine of “odious debts” could not 
                                                                                             
 22. See RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 
108–10 (Michael Kindred trans., La. State Univ. Press 1972) (1960). 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 (1987) (formation of customary law). 
 24. The question as to whether or not a legal regulation of this sort is an instrument of 
international, public or civil law is of more technical interest, and the issue will not be 
analyzed in any more depth here. See generally AUGUST REINISCH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR DEBTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEBT RESTRUCTUR-
ING (1995). 
 25. There are of course de facto problems in obtaining legally binding confirmation 
that contracts of this sort are null and void, and even greater difficulties involved in stipu-
lating the legal consequences of a decision of this sort. 
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add any additional, more serious, or further-reaching form of invalid-
ity—with the exception perhaps of a demonstratively expressed stronger 
moralistic condemnation. 
Any legally recognised doctrine of “odious debts” would thus only 
come into play over and above the (long-standing) legal instruments al-
ready in use. Since the doctrine would be used to enforce certain moral 
values, an attempt would have to be made to reach a global agreement on 
these moral values because the simple fact of the matter is that here, as in 
many other instances, the values praised by one appear to be unaccept-
able to another. Considerations pertaining to a clarification (or even dis-
cussion) of this sort have no place in a legal study.  However, we will 
simply state that the goals of having the “odious debts” doctrine accepted 
as a legal principle must surely be to leave a dictatorial regime high and 
dry in material terms, and thus to foster democratic forms of government. 
For, in line with the variations of the doctrine of “odious debts” proposed 
thus far, the potential lender can only be sure at the planning stage that 
the sum borrowed will be repaid in the latter case. 
IV. PROS AND CONS OF “ODIOUS DEBTS” 
Whatever the finer details of these objectives, we must examine in le-
gal terms the pros and cons of introducing (or establishing) the doctrine 
of “odious debts.” 
A. Cons 
The most crucial and obvious argument against establishing the doc-
trine of “odious debts” is the basic legal principle of pacta sunt servanda 
(pacts must be respected).26 This ancient principle is not based on in-
flexible and stubborn legal thinking, but on the recognition of the value 
of having a firm basis for planning, not only for the economy but also for 
interpersonal dealings in general. Even if the “invention” of the contract 
per se is not necessarily the result of a need for future security of this sort 
or in some other form, the binding nature of a contract, once entered into, 
is a matter of personal and economic interest. We should not lose sight of 
the fact that any incursions into this security will trigger a response on 
the part of the affected party, which ought to be taken into account before 
any pertinent new legal principle is introduced. 
                                                                                             
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 321 cmt. a (1987) (noting that pacta sunt servanda “lies at the core of the law 
of international agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international 
law.”); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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In the case at hand, the response might well be that the willingness of 
potential lenders to grant loans decreases dramatically. We can, of 
course, counter that this is precisely the desired effect (see Part III.B) of 
the doctrine—that certain states or certain governments are unable to 
borrow money. However plausible this argument might appear at first 
sight, if we disregard for the moment the fate of the population (i.e., each 
individual citizen) affected, the consequences are far-reaching. However, 
as morally repugnant as it might seem to lend money to a generally ab-
horred dictator, what about the loans accorded to his in-no-way-
disreputable predecessor27 which are due for repayment under the regime 
of the current dictator? Who is to set the yardstick for what is to be 
deemed “generally abhorred?” What will happen if a head of government 
with a hitherto unblemished reputation suddenly turns bad during his 
period in office? Should a sort of blacklist be drawn up of endangered 
countries?28 
The list of questions of this nature could easily continue. However, the 
examples already given indicate the trend that a doctrine of “odious 
debts” would imply a politicisation and moralisation of legal considera-
tions, 29  which would undoubtedly make it more difficult to borrow 
money in many cases and would entirely preclude it in others. This can-
not be the overall desired effect because the populations of the countries 
affected would then bear the brunt of the changes. If the aim is not to 
introduce any across-the-board bans on lending, but to deem legally un-
tenable those loans or parts of loans that fall into the category of “odi-
ous” on an individual basis, this will at the very least involve considera-
bly higher costs on the part of lenders since they will have to monitor the 
actions of their borrowers more closely. Lenders will not be able to cir-
                                                                                             
 27. It is more than just a historical footnote that the term “dictator” stems from the 
ancient Roman republic where this office was seen as a salvation in a desperate situation. 
See WOLFGANG KUNKEL & MARTIN SCHERMAIER, RÖMISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 22 
(13th ed. 2001). 
 28. A proposal of this sort is made by Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odi-
ous Debt (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/webpapers/Odious_Debt05.pdf (pro-
posing to impose loan sanctions in lieu of trade sanctions against dictatorial regimes). An 
(unofficial) list of this sort already exists in the United States in conjunction with the 
infamous Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). See AmnestyUSA.org, An-
nual Report: The State of Human Rights, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/ 
annualreport.html. Anyone transacting with the governments of these countries (currently 
about 150) runs the risk of being taken to court in the United States today by the popula-
tions of these countries. 
 29. See Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004). 
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cumvent their responsibility to refuse to be part of “odious debts” by in-
corporating simple provisions in their lending agreements to the effect 
that the funds lent are to be used for generally accepted purposes. Conse-
quently, if the costs of monitoring borrowers rise, the costs of borrowing 
will increase, in turn making borrowing prohibitively expensive for some 
countries, while severely restricting the borrowing capacities of others. 
B. Pros 
On the other hand, we must realise that there is a current worldwide 
trend to erode the principle of pacta sunt servanda which has been held 
in such esteem for thousands of years. In the field of civil law, we can 
point to consumer protection law, which has been developing over the 
last forty or so years.30 One of its main achievements has been to make it 
significantly easier to rescind a contract, thus making serious inroads into 
the binding nature of contracts.31 
While it is true that this comparison is not entirely apt—given that con-
sumers play no part in the borrowing sector involved here and that con-
sumer protection law regularly excludes “non-consumers” from its field 
of application—it should still be mentioned since calls for the recogni-
tion of the doctrine of “odious debts” practically all appear to be based 
on a de facto power gap between the lender and the borrower (or at least 
the population of the borrowing state). Given the fact that globalisation is 
shrinking our world to the “global village” in which international law is 
increasingly moving into areas that were hitherto the prerogative of civil 
law,32 the parallel drawn between consumer protection under civil law 
and international law no longer appears quite so unthinkable. 
Equally, the “erosion” of the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
slowly being seen in international law. It is no coincidence that here too 
(although still in very few isolated cases) the principle of democracy, 
which is enshrined in international public law, is being taken as a ground 
to justify the cancellation of long-standing contracts, although no reason 
                                                                                             
 30. See, e.g., Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guaran-
tees, art. 3, para. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12, 15. 
 31. Id. 
 32. It is enough to mention the discussion on the introduction of a state insolvency 
law. See Christoph G. Paulus, A Statutory Procedure for Restructuring Debts of Sover-
eign States, in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT No. 49, at 401–06 (Thomas 
Wegerich et al. eds., 2003); see also Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign Bankruptcy: In re Ger-
many (1953), In re Iraq (2004), 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 302 (2004). 
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exists to terminate the contract under either its agreed upon terms or 
other valid legal provisions.33 
In view of these findings, we must conclude that the introduction of a 
legally binding doctrine of “odious debts” is not automatically con-
demned to failure on the ground that contracts, once concluded, must be 
honoured. Another qualification of this basic principle by no means im-
plies a fundamental rejection of the traditional principle—particularly in 
view of the erosion of the binding nature of this principle that can be ob-
served in many areas of law worldwide. On the other hand, it must be 
said that the introduction of any doctrine of this sort will make it more 
difficult to borrow money in the future, thus potentially worsening the 
living conditions of entire populations. 
V. APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM 
If we sum up the findings so far, we can state the following: the doc-
trine of “odious debts” has not yet achieved the status of customary law. 
The desired introduction serves the goal (inter alia) of undermining the 
material basis of dictatorships and fostering democratisation worldwide. 
The introduction of the doctrine would doubtless make it more difficult 
to borrow money but would not entail any fundamental break with exist-
ing law. 
If these are the starting conditions for any doctrine of “odious debts” in 
whatever form, we must then look at the finer points. What form should 
the doctrine take or how should it be formulated in legal terms in order to 
achieve the intended objectives? The answer to this entails two steps. 
First, we must look at the approaches proposed to date, and second, we 
must devise our own proposal. 
A. Response (ad hoc) 
The cases to date in which the doctrine of “odious debts” has been in-
voked (Cuba and Costa Rica) are, from a legal point of view, particularly 
unfortunate cases of the application of “law.”34 By deciding retrospec-
tively on the legal nullity of the debts, they preclude the steering impact 
of law already discussed in Part III.A. If it is uncertain ex ante whether or 
not the sword of Damocles of legal unenforceability is merely hanging 
                                                                                             
 33. See Christian B. Fulda, Demokratie und pacta sunt servanda (Oct. 10, 2002) (un-
published dissertation), http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/ (follow “dissertationen” hyperlink; then 
follow “F” hyperlink; then follow “Fulda, Christian B.” hyperlink); see also Chander, 
supra note 29. 
 34. See supra Part II. 
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over the sum lent, or whether it might actually fall, the foundation for 
determining the cost of loans begins to wobble. If the sword falls, the 
lender must bear the risk that the borrower might not conform to the 
norms of acceptable and accepted behaviour. At best, this appears to be 
perhaps a morally justified preferential treatment for the population thus 
freed from the yoke of debts, but in legal terms it is difficult to reconcile 
with a basic sense of justice. 
At this juncture we should, however, add a qualification. The idea of 
the law as a steering instrument can be put into practice in various ways. 
In Germany, for instance, it takes a different form from that adopted in 
the United States. In Germany, the legislator is held to be responsible for 
ensuring security in planning, which means that the feasible path to be 
taken must be laid down ex ante in great detail,35 whereas in the United 
States, the prevalent philosophy is that individuals are free to wheel and 
deal as they please, but that in so doing they accept the risk that some 
court might at some point in time brand this past wheeling and dealing 
illegal.36 So what would appear untenable in Germany is the expression 
of a fundamental understanding of liberty in the United States. 
B. Prevention (ex ante) 
Having looked at these premises, it would thus appear preferable, from 
a German point of view, to develop preventive criteria for a doctrine of 
“odious debts” that is to be applied in the future. 
1. The New Proposal 
a) This approach is in line with the Canadian proposal mentioned 
above.37 It extends Sack’s criteria, stating three conditions—lack of con-
sent on the part of the people, the loan not being in the interests of the 
people, and the lender’s knowledge of the other two facts. If all three 
conditions are met, this would render the debt null and void, thus effec-
tively freeing the borrower from the obligation to repay the debt. 
b) Two positive aspects of this proposal should be mentioned. First, by 
pinpointing “creditor awareness,” it stands out from many other propos-
                                                                                             
 35. See Eckart Klein & Thomas Giegerich, The Parliamentary Democracy, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 150–51 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 
1988). 
 36. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5 
GERMAN L.J. 1413 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/.Vol05No 
12/PDF_Vol_05_No_12_1413-1429_SI_Carrington.pdf (arguing that business conduct in 
the United States is regulated ex post by private plaintiffs “in the form of civil money 
judgments rather than ex ante in the form of official approval or disapproval.”). 
 37. See supra Part II. 
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als and ideas advanced by various NGOs, which simply ignore (inten-
tionally or unintentionally) this condition.38 It is quite clear that this can-
not be, and one would assume that there is no need to belabor the point. 
However, in order to make things as clear as possible, we should stress 
the fact that it would be extremely unjust, in line with all precepts of jus-
tice that exist in the civilised world, to foist on a lender, merely because 
he is a lender, the risk that the funds lent by him might be used for some 
improper purpose. This risk can only be attributed to the lender if he can 
subjectively be held responsible for the “odious” use to which the bor-
rowed sum is put. 
The second positive aspect is that the proposal does not concentrate on 
a change of government or regime, which was the case in both Cuba and 
Costa Rica, and which was more or less explicitly taken as a major con-
tributory ground or appeared to play a major role in Sack’s proposals. A 
result of this sort might de facto play an important part in honouring ex-
isting commitments. For instance, what dictator, however rough, would 
plead that his debts were null and void on the basis of the doctrine of 
“odious debts,” when in the future he would be dependent on borrowing 
more funds at regular intervals. However, in legal terms, we must always 
see the “odiousness,” however we choose to define it, independent of and 
separate from any such government or regime change. The fact that such 
regime change takes place does not make the funds previously lent and 
used in any way more odious. The change per se is nothing that could 
increase the burden of guilt of an odious dictator. We can thus conclude 
that a legally binding doctrine of “odious debts” is independent of any 
such change in government or regime. The debt per se is odious; it does 
not merely become odious because of any change in the actors involved. 
c) At the same time, however, the criteria contained in the Canadian 
proposal must be criticised because they are too vague and therefore in-
calculable. 
If the consent of the population is needed, the application of the doc-
trine must (surely) be excluded where a democratically elected govern-
ment is in power. Whether this or the opposite case genuinely limits the 
desired target group sufficiently, appears questionable. Firstly, we must 
ask how we should proceed in the case of a mock democracy, in which 
the government claims to be legitimated by the votes of the people, as is 
the case in “true” democracies. Secondly, monocracies automatically fail 
to meet this requirement. Monarchs or spiritual heads of a religious state 
                                                                                             
 38. Surprisingly, the same is true for the abovementioned definition of the Interna-
tional Law Commission. See supra note 18. 
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are thus, by virtue of the structure of the state, branded “odious,” which 
will automatically make it more difficult for them to borrow money and 
will thus make borrowing more expensive for them. 
This leads us to the underlying and truly fundamental question—
namely, who should define who is a dictator under the terms of the doc-
trine of “odious debts?” This is an extremely delicate question which 
cannot be answered using the yardstick of existing law, or indeed, exist-
ing philosophy. The answer that “any government that is not legitimated 
by the people” is a dictatorship can in no way be accepted as being suffi-
ciently precise. 
The other objective criterion of the Canadian proposal—absence of 
benefit—suffers from the same shortcomings. Who is to provide the 
yardstick against which “benefit” is to be measured? This is an important 
inquiry in both factual and temporal terms: in factual terms because it 
must be possible to define ex ante what serves the interests of the popula-
tion and what does not. However, there are no blanket answers to this 
question. Weapons purchases, for instance (to take a particularly contro-
versial example), are only discreditable because of the individual circum-
stances that accompany them—i.e., if they are to be used for an unjusti-
fied war of aggression or for other criminal purposes, but not if they are 
to be used for the country’s own defence. Or, to take another example, 
funds might be used to install a system of repression in the form of pris-
ons, but what number of prisons can be said to be in the interests of the 
population and what number can be considered excessive and hence no 
longer in their interests? Nobody would seriously suggest that a country 
should not be allowed to build prisons at all. 
Still, doubts are justified in the other direction as well. The construc-
tion of schools and hospitals is generally considered to be in the interests 
of the population. However, what is to happen if these schools and hospi-
tals remain the sole prerogative of the rich or of the family of the ruler? 
The question is, to put it succinctly, who are the “people” and who 
should represent them? 
This brings us to the temporal aspect. At which point should we ask 
about the “benefit”—at the time of lending or the time at which a deci-
sion is made as to whether or not the debt is odious? From a legal stance, 
it can only make sense to look to the time of lending. Otherwise, lenders 
would be expected to perform monitoring functions, which they would 
either be unable to perform, or which would make the loan prohibitively 
expensive. 
Finally, we must also criticise the subjective criterion of “creditor 
awareness.” While creditor awareness, as already mentioned, is essential, 
the focus cannot exclusively be on the positive knowledge on the part of 
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the lender. This would make it all too easy to circumvent the doctrine. If 
it is to be applicable in practice to any real degree, the subjective yard-
stick must be worded more precisely, for instance, such that positive 
knowledge is considered equal to ignorance resulting from gross negli-
gence. 
2. Lex Mercatoria 
While we must concede that the criticism above appears to imply that 
it is possible to achieve greater precision, it must be said that at least at 
present this will be difficult since we have not advanced beyond consid-
ering the structure of a statutory definition. Having said this, though, we 
can attempt to come closer to an appropriate solution—and do so without 
departing too far from what we have dealt with so far. It is particularly 
helpful to base our work on existing models the legal character of which 
is unquestionable. 
This stance allows us to look at a complex set of regulations which can 
best claim to be accepted worldwide, or at least to be the lex mercatoria39 
complied with—the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts.40 Courts in many countries increasingly rely on these princi-
ples when they are called on to judge international contracts where it is 
not entirely clear which legal system should apply.41 Since the lending 
agreements we are dealing with here are generally of a commercial na-
ture, it is natural that we should take the UNIDROIT Principles as our 
guidelines. Article 3.1(b) restricts the field of application of the 
UNIDROIT Principles in that they do not deal with invalidity arising 
from immorality.42 Thus, the lex mercatoria makes no express statement 
on this generally accepted legal principle, which comes closest to the 
doctrine of “odious debts.” This is a reflection firstly of the unwilling-
ness to incorporate moral aspects into the legal sphere, and secondly of 
                                                                                             
 39. On the lex mercatoria in general, see JAN DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 191–98 (2d ed. 2004). 
 40. Int’l Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contracts (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/ 
principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf [hereinafter UNIDROIT Princi-
ples]. 
 41. See Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles and the Lex Mercatoria, in 
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 249, 249 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 2004); Mi-
chael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of Interpreting and Supple-
menting International Uniform Law, 13 INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 29–31 (Special Supp. 
2002). 
 42. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 40, ch. 3, art. 3.1(b). 
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the realization that standards of morality vary so widely the world over 
that it would be impossible to find a common denominator. 
Nevertheless, Article 3.10 does provide for basic rules when there is an 
“excessive advantage” between the duties of the parties, as a result of 
which the pertinent contract can be contested.43 This right exists “if, at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the contract or term unjustifia-
bly gave the other party an excessive advantage.”44 The text goes on to 
list the factors that should be taken into consideration: “the fact that the 
other party has taken unfair advantage of the first party’s dependence, 
economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, 
inexperience or lack of bargaining skill,”45 as well as “the nature and 
purpose of the contract.”46 
It is not entirely certain, however, whether or not this approach can be 
developed to produce an operational doctrine of “odious debts.” Even if 
there is indeed a gross disparity between the lender’s duty and the duty 
of the people of the borrowing state, in the kinds of cases of interest here, 
it is unlikely that there is a great disparity between the lender and the 
representative of the borrowing state (which is, in legal terms, the only 
relevant party here). 
3. Case Groups 
Nevertheless, the above lex mercatoria approach can be used in other 
ways. We can apply the methods of combining various elements pre-
scribed in Article 3.10 to the question of “odious debts.” This is not un-
usual in terms of legislation and is often encountered in the national 
standardisation of open offences such as the immorality of legal transac-
tions. At first glance, this procedure might seem even less precise than 
the three conditions laid down in the Canadian proposal, but the advan-
tage of the method proposed here compared with the criticised lack of 
precision in the attempts hitherto to concretise the doctrine of “odious 
debts” is as follows. 
The odiousness of a debt is not automatic, provided the said factual 
elements are met. Instead, a number of diverse facts must be seen in con-
text before a decision is made in each individual case. This procedure, 
which will initially have to commence by force of circumstances, can be 
defined with increased precision as more experience is gained by estab-
lishing so-called case groups. Once established, these case groups will 
                                                                                             
 43. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.10(1). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.10(1)(a). 
 46. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.10(1)(b). 
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represent the experience gained in several cases such that when this level 
of experience is gained, an individual case can be accorded to an already 
recognised case group of “odious debts” and the legal consequences will 
then become axiomatic. Thus, while the rulings in the beginning will 
have the flair of some kind of decisionism—since they are made without 
any pre-existing experience and without directly comparable material—
they will gain predictability and certainty in the long term and will even-
tually line up to create a coherent chain of decisions. 
The advantage of this procedure is that the large number of possible 
case constellations is not forced from the outset into a straight-jacket of 
predefined characteristics. Instead, it ensures the necessary openness that 
allows us to take into account the wide range of possible options. With 
every case dealt with, however, the acquired experience will grow with 
the result that the initial openness can gradually be replaced with increas-
ingly precise formulations, culminating in the establishment of case 
groups. 
In terms of the foreseeability and calculability for potential lenders, 
which we have considered at several junctures to be extremely important, 
national experience with standards of this sort (in Germany we need only 
quote section 138 of the German Civil Code or BGB (Immorality of Le-
gal Transactions))47 indicates that this form of standard-setting is accept-
able. Also, if the criteria for the assessment of each individual case are 
sufficiently clear, lenders can more easily anticipate the outcome than 
would be the case with the definitions of factual elements, which in 
many ways are too narrow and/or too broad. 
Apart from the above mentioned considerations, we always need to be 
able to impute “odiousness” to both sides with no exceptions. In addition 
to subjective prerequisites, such as knowledge of the purpose for which 
the funds would be used or the fact that the lender should have had such 
knowledge, the following paragraphs outline the main criteria. 
Borrower’s Representative 
For reasons of legal precision, the term “borrower’s representative” 
must first be explained. While we often speak of the “borrower,” in the 
cases relevant here, this term is inappropriate. The “borrower” is always 
                                                                                             
 47. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] 1896, § 138(1) (F.R.G.). For the 
approach taken in the United States, see 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2003). For 
an international law perspective, see Alfred von Verdross, Der Grundsaz “pacta sunt 
servanda” und die Grenze der “guten Sitten” im Völkerrecht, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 79 (1936). 
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the country in question and not the natural person who is to be targeted 
by the doctrine of “odious debts,” i.e., the dictator or despotic ruler. 
Thus, the focus should not be on the borrower, but on the person who 
uses the borrower in order to take out a loan. In somewhat simplified 
terms, we shall use the term “borrower’s representative” to designate this 
person hereinafter. 
It is generally accepted in the analysis of the case of Costa Rica dis-
cussed above or of Iraq at present that the odiousness of a debt can arise 
as a result of the person or the behaviour of this borrower’s representa-
tive. However, the question as to how a necessary degree of censure can 
be identified is extremely difficult to answer and can only be touched on 
here. It is by no means sufficient to define the circle of individuals af-
fected in terms of their lack of democratic legitimation (see Part V.B.1), 
unless we wish to consider it odious per se that there is no “genuine” 
democracy in that country. We can define more usable criteria if we 
measure the legitimation of the borrower’s representative by taking gen-
erally accepted requirements as a yardstick. International law can help us 
here48—for instance, fundamental principles such as jus cogens.49 We 
could, perhaps, also use the conventions on human rights to which the 
state in question is a signatory. 
It is true, all the same, that the consequence of gearing action to these 
yardsticks of values is that one category of “odiousness,” which has often 
been advanced and which was specifically mentioned in the arbitration in 
the Costa Rica case, cannot be identified—namely the use of the loan for 
the personal purposes of the borrower’s representative. The borrowing 
state, rather than the lender, must demand repayment from the ruler who 
has thus benefited personally. 
Creditors 
Another advantage of the concrete definitions of a doctrine of “odious 
debts” proposed here is that it opens our eyes to the fact that the odious-
ness need not be caused by the state representative alone. It is only rarely 
noted that the very first instance where the doctrine of “odious debts” 
was applied, in Cuba, is a case in which the creditor (in this case Spain) 
                                                                                             
 48. The present proposal coincides with the idea expressed by the International Law 
Commission in their abovementioned definition. See supra note 18. 
 49. Under the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is void 
if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 347. 
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was responsible for giving the debt its negative character.50 Again, the 
aim here is not to make moral issues or values the sole criteria for as-
sessment, and so in this context too, the fundamental principles of inter-
national law already cited in the above section, perhaps accompanied by 
human rights conventions to which the lender’s state is a signatory, will 
have to be used. If, for instance, debts arise as a result of an unjustified 
war of aggression, at least one criterion of odiousness would be met.51 
Purpose of the Loan 
Another criterion used to identify “odious debts” is the purpose of the 
loan. However, great caution is called for here because the truism that 
there are two sides to every story applies here as well. We have already 
pointed out above that weapons purchases or the construction of prisons 
are not odious per se, just as the construction of schools and hospitals 
need not necessarily be an automatic blessing for the population.52 The 
purpose of a given loan will have to be assessed against the provisions of 
international law in order to produce generally binding value-based yard-
sticks. 
General Circumstances 
Another criterion that will have to be defined more precisely, and will 
surely be defined more precisely in the future, is the general circum-
stances under which the loan is granted. The high standards of interna-
tional law norms need not necessarily be applied exclusively here. To 
fine-tune the identification of “odiousness,” other circumstances could 
also play a part, such as money laundering, cooperation with internation-
ally wanted criminals (i.e., drug dealers, etc.) or comparable factors. 
4. Result 
In conclusion, a doctrine of “odious debts” appears to be legally practi-
cable if it is based on more precisely defined standards than has been the 
                                                                                             
 50. This peculiarity is noted by Jürgen Kaiser & Antje Queck, Odious Debts—Odious 
Creditors? International Claims on Iraq, at 7 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dialogue on 
Globalization, Occasional Papers Nov. 12, 2004), http://www.fes-geneva.org/public 
ations/OccasionalPapers/FES%20OccPapers%2012.pdf. 
 51. See U.N. GAOR, Int’l L. Comm’n, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, at 17, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/517 (Apr. 2, 2001) (prepared by James Crawford) (arguing that viola-
tions of international law, such as genocide and wars of aggression “are such an affront to 
the international community as a whole that they need to be distinguished from other 
violations, [as in] the laws of war . . .”). 
 52. See supra Part V.B.1.c. 
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case to date. This can be achieved by taking a step back from the factual 
elements which are not detailed enough and by replacing them with an 
open factual element of “odious debts,” which would then be limited by 
an assessment of factors that are as concrete as possible, so as to estab-
lish case groups. If these are to gain general acceptance, the value-based 
yardsticks used must be stringent—they cannot be allowed to reflect only 
the ethical beliefs of one small group. If these factors are considered in 
relation to one another, and if a certain debt is judged “odious” on this 
basis, we must still demonstrate that both parties involved are account-
able with the help of subjective criteria (knowledge on the part of the 
lender or the fact that the lender should have had this knowledge). If this 
is the case, the legal consequences will follow. 
VI. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
This final, apparently banal statement conceals a problem. What should 
the legal consequences be? If the goal of the doctrine of “odious debts” is 
to legally exonerate a state from its obligation to honour its debts, pro-
vided it meets the terms of this doctrine, it is not really appropriate to 
declare the automatic nullity of the loan agreement or to bestow upon it 
the right to repudiate the contract. For, if only the legal basis (i.e., the 
loan agreement) were declared null and void, the lender could demand 
the repayment of at least the sum granted as a loan on the ground of un-
just enrichment. Whether or not this would apply to the agreed interest is 
uncertain. We should also point out once again that a large number of 
loan agreements are likely to be null and void anyway because they con-
travene inter-state formalities. 
If we are to achieve the declared goal of the doctrine of “odious debts,” 
then we must not only have the loan agreement declared null and void, 
but also preclude demands for repayment on the ground of unjust en-
richment. There is a parallel to this in the civil law of almost all legal 
systems based on Roman law (i.e., from late nineteenth century Europe) 
in the form of a provision corresponding to the German Civil Code 
(BGB) section 817.53 According to these provisions, the lender is not 
entitled to demand repayment on the ground of unjust enrichment if both 
the borrower and the lender can be accused of unethical behaviour under 
certain circumstances.54 
                                                                                             
 53. In the United States, this legal consequence is applied in cases when a contract is 
illegal. See PETER HAY, U.S.-AMERIKANISCHES RECHT 56 (2000). 
 54. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1370 (Fr.); Código Civil Federal [C.C.F.] 
[FEDERAL CIVIL CODE] art. 1882 (Mex.).   
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VII. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
One final, extremely important question pertains to the institution that 
is to be responsible for enforcing this new legal principle. Because of 
well-known reservations, this responsibility should not be accorded to 
the IMF/World Bank55 or to the International Court in The Hague.56 Ad 
hoc arbitration, like the Iran-U.S. tribunal, is unlikely to be acceptable 
because the specific power relations in that case are unlikely to be repli-
cated. However, using a different arbitration court in each instance would 
prejudice the establishment of case groups proposed in this study. A 
fairly consistent court or panel would be needed for this. 
Under these circumstances, we find ourselves faced with only two op-
tions: either we use existing court institutions or we create a new adjudi-
cative body. One option would be the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO pursuant to Article III(3) of the Convention of 15 April 1994.57 
This would be the preferred solution because this body has already gath-
ered a wealth of expertise in global legal disputes. 
A second option, creating a new body, could be the responsibility of 
the United Nations58—perhaps to be transferred to UNCTAD because of 
the subject matter involved. Procedures could be based on those pro-
posed by the IMF for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM) and the pertinent Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF).59 
Such a panel of judges would have the exclusive power to decide the 
relevant cases. The rules containing the details of the procedure could be 
established by that very panel itself (thereby following the U.S. model). 
However, it should be clear from the outset that any suit brought before 
the panel can be initiated only by a petition. A general duty to initiate 
                                                                                             
 55. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Nov. 2003, at 42, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/debt/2003/ 
11odiousdebts.htm (arguing that the IMF playing a central role in the bankrupcy process 
would be problematic because it is one of the international community’s major creditors). 
 56. This Court, of course, could be involved under the present conditions only if both 
parties to the loan agreement are States. 
 57. For a description of this panel and how it works, see MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, 
INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, in JURISTISCHE KURZ-LEHRBÜCHER NO. 4, § 7, at 
151 (2003); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN & GERHARD LOIBL, DAS RECHT DER 
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN EINSCHLIEßLICH DER SUPERANATIONALEN 
GEMEINSCHAFTEN 182, para. 1312 (7th ed. 2000); JOHN JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
GATT AND THE WTO 133 (2000). 
 58. See Stiglitz, supra note 55, at 42. 
 59. See Christoph G. Paulus, Die Rolle des Richters in einem Künftigen SDRM, in 
HANS-PETER KIRCHHOF, INSOLVENZRECHT IM WANDEL DER ZEIT: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-
PETER KIRCHHOF ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG 421 (2003). 
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suit would instead require a worldwide control system which is bound 
(according to national experiences) to be selective and thereby ineffi-
cient. The consequential question—namely who should be given the 
right to file a petition—is, as a matter of course, a political one. 
The answer depends on what one tries to achieve with the new legal 
principle. If only the parties to the loan contract in question were permit-
ted to file a petition, it would seem more likely than not that a procedure 
would be initiated only after a change of government or political system, 
since it might be assumed that hardly any party would have an interest in 
learning that a debt is “odious” unless it goes through such a political 
change. In contrast, if the circle of potential candidates for initiating such 
lawsuits is drawn too broadly (including, e.g., NGOs), this would foster a 
certain control mentality which, in turn, would result in a whole set of 
further problems. Thus, it is necessary to find an appropriate process 
which guarantees access to the panel in cases of “odious debts” without 
imposing an unbearable control mechanism on the parties involved. 
VIII. RESULTS 
The above deliberations can be summed up in the following results: 
• The doctrine of “odious debts” has not yet acquired the status of a 
legal rule. The only conceivable source of law would be customary 
law, but the necessary prerequisites have not yet been met. 
• The existing proposals for defining an “odious debts” doctrine 
make very clear the direction in which the doctrine is headed. 
However, the proposed definitions are still not precise enough to 
be acceptable as a general rule. What is needed is a higher degree 
of flexibility. 
• A heightened degree of flexibility could be achieved by establish-
ing open factual elements with sufficiently precise assessment fac-
tors in order to establish case groups over the course of time. 
• The legal consequences of this “odious debts” doctrine would not 
only be the nullification of the underlying loan agreement, but also 
the denial of the right of the lender to demand repayment on the 
ground of unjust enrichment. 
• The court responsible for judging whether or not a debt is “odious” 
could either be the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO/GATT or 
a new court set up by the United Nations along the lines of the 
DRF. 
 
